Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Peter Norvig on Prisoner’s Dilemma - Dictionary of Arguments
Norvig I 669 Prisoner’s dilemma/Norvig/Russell: Nash equilibrium: every game has at least one equilibrium. Clearly, a dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (…) but some games have Nash equilibria but no dominant strategies. Problem: The dilemma in the prisoner’s dilemma is that the equilibrium outcome is worse for both players than the outcome they would get if they both refused to testify. In other words, (testify, testify) is Pareto dominated by the (-1, -1) outcome of (refuse, refuse). Is there any way for Alice and Bob to arrive at the (-1, -1) outcome? Solutions: we could change to a repeated game in which the players know that they will meet again. Or the agents might have moral beliefs that encourage cooperation and fairness. That means they have a different utility function, necessitating a different payoff matrix, making it a different game. >Value/AI research. Norvig I 687 The prisoner’s dilemma was invented as a classroom exercise by Albert W. Tucker in 1950 (based on an example by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher) and is covered extensively by Axelrod (1985)(1) and Poundstone (1993)(2). Repeated games were introduced by Luce and Raiffa (1957)(3), and games of partial information in extensive form by Kuhn (1953)(4). The first practical algorithm for sequential, partial-information games was developed within AI by Koller et al. (1996)(5); the paper by Koller and Pfeffer (1997)(6) provides a readable introduction to the field and describe a working system for representing and solving sequential games. 1. Axelrod, R. (1985). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. 2. Poundstone, W. (1993). Prisoner’s Dilemma. Anchor. 3. Luce, D. R. and Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions. Wiley. 4. Kuhn, H.W. (1953). Extensive games and the problem of information. In Kuhn, H. W. and Tucker, A. W. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II. Princeton University Press. 5. Koller, D., Meggido, N., and von Stengel, B. (1996). Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games. Games and Economic Behaviour, 14(2), 247–-259. 6. Koller, D. and Pfeffer, A. (1997). Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems. AIJ, 94(1–2), 167-215._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29